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A PUBLIC TRUST ARGUMENT FOR PUBLIC
ACCESS TO PRIVATE CONSERVATION LAND
SARAH C. SMITH
INTRODUCTION
Urban renaissances notwithstanding, American cities have dra-
matically changed in the last fifty years. Downtowns and small towns
are on the way out. Suburbs have replaced towns, and corporate
campuses are preferred to skyscrapers in expanding cities.1 In general,
people are building lower and wider. Necessarily, this kind of devel-
opment requires land. As cities sprawl out, they incorporate more and
more previously open land. Faced with changes they do not like, con-
cerned residents have become activists, fighting to protect open
space. And the first logical place to start is Washington, D.C.
The federal government owns twenty-nine percent of land in this
country, predominantly in the western states and Alaska.2 Federal
land management policies have developed as the country has grown,
and many give greater preference to resource developers than preser-
vationists would like.3 The ranching industry, for example, depends
heavily on cheap federal grazing permits.4 Countering development
Copyright © 2002 by Sarah C. Smith.
1. See Robert Fishman, Beyond Suburbia: The Rise of the Technoburb, in THE CITY
READER 490 (Richard T. LeGates & Frederic Stout eds. 1996) (noting a shift in development
from the traditional city/suburb model to an expanding metropolis model).
2. Dale A. Oesterle, Public Land: How Much Is Enough?, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 521, 523
(1996).
3. See JOSEPH L. SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE
NATIONAL PARKS 5, 7–9 (1980) (discussing the value judgments inherent in use decisions re-
garding the creation of the national parks); CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT
MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 17 (1992) (arguing that outdated
nineteenth-century policies still dominate land management in the West, to the detriment of the
land itself).
4. Oesterle, supra note 2, at 527.
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interests, environmentalists dating from John Muir have lobbied for
the pristine conservation of federal land.5 Trying to find the best
course between solutions advocated by environmental interest
groups, locals, state governments, industry, and the “national good,”
the agencies responsible for administering the federal holdings often
succeed in pleasing no one.6
While some environmental groups continue to lobby for the
preservation of federally held lands, other activists have opted to do it
themselves. Land trusts are popular private alternatives to slow-
acting government agencies bogged down in bureaucratic regula-
tions—and their use is growing.7 A land trust is a nonprofit organiza-
tion that preserves land by acquiring it through purchase or donation
and dedicating it to conservation.8 The amount of land protected by
local and regional land use action has grown 226 percent since 1990.9
Although land trusts are private, they benefit greatly from public
support. Land trusts enjoy special tax treatment, both through their
nonprofit status and through the federal conservation contribution
tax deduction.10 This public subsidy signifies general approval of land
trusts and their activities. The approval land trusts enjoy is not sur-
prising. Because land trusts operate through voluntary transactions
such as sales and donations, they are among the least controversial
members of the environmental community. Unfortunately, the un-
5. Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation on Public Lands, 26 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 140, 193–95 (1999).
6. Part of the difficulty facing these agencies may lie in the fact that there is no original
mandate for the lands. See SAX, supra note 3, at 5 (commenting that “[w]hat exactly was meant
to be accomplished by these unprecedented [national parks] is a mystery that will never be fully
solved”).
7. See, e.g., Julie Ann Gustanski, Protecting the Land: Conservation Easements, Voluntary
Actions, and Private Lands, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE 17–18 (Julie Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000) [herein-
after PROTECTING THE LAND] (commenting that the dramatic increase in land trusts is fueled in
part by conservationists’ disappointment in the government’s ability to protect open space).
8. SALLY K. FAIRFAX & DARLA GUENZLER, CONSERVATION TRUSTS 21 (2001). Even
though some organizations that differ from the description above nonetheless call themselves
“land trusts,” this Note uses the Fairfax and Guenzler definition for clarity’s sake.
9. See Summary Data from the National Land Trust Census, Land Trust Alliance, at
http://www.lta.org/newsroom/census_summary_data.htm (Sept. 12, 2001) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (attributing the amount of land protected to three sources: conservation ease-
ments, land owned by trusts, and land transferred to government or other organizations). The
Census actually undercounted the amount of land privately protected because it only counted
land in local and regional land trusts, to the exclusion of land held by national and international
land trusts such as the Nature Conservancy. Id.
10. See infra Part I.
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foreseen impacts of land trust activity may actually disadvantage the
general public.
Most importantly, land trusts could lead to a diminution of the
open space that is actually available to the public. Because the land
trusts become private owners of the land, they acquire the right to ex-
clude as well as the right to conserve. The initial question that arises is
whether the favorable tax treatment that the land trusts receive justi-
fies imposing a public access requirement. Assuming that such a re-
quirement is necessary, the next question is how such public access is
to be provided. The goal of this Note is to examine the various legal
mechanisms available.
This Note first describes what a land trust is and how it operates.
Next, this Note briefly discusses why land trusts pose a risk to open
space availability as well as why they should be required to provide
public access. Then, this Note argues that the public trust doctrine al-
ready provides for limited public access to some of the land held by
land trusts. Because the public trust doctrine does not authorize ac-
cess that would harm the land, access is necessarily limited. Finally,
the Note sketches the public trust response to the two major argu-
ments against public access, the takings challenge and the environ-
mental consequences of public access.
I.  THE NEED FOR PUBLIC ACCESS
Before exploring the details of the access debate, it is necessary
to give context to the controversy. What are land trusts, and how
could they be considered harmful?
A. Land Trusts
The term “land trust” is a loose one. It has no legal definition,
and has been claimed by a variety of different organizations.11 Put
very generally, a land trust is an organization that works to protect
11. FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra note 8, at 21; see also LAND TRUST ALLIANCE,
STARTING A LAND TRUST: A GUIDE TO FORMING A LAND CONSERVATION ORGANIZATION 1
(1990) (discussing the many ways in which land trusts are involved in conservation); Nancy A.
McLaughlin, The Role of Land Trusts in Biodiversity Conservation on Private Lands, 38 IDAHO
L. REV. 453, 453 (2002) (noting a recent explosion in “the number of private nonprofit organiza-
tions, typically referred to as ‘land trusts’”).
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land from development.12 Usually land trusts are nonprofit organiza-
tions,13 but, beyond that, the similarities end. Despite the term “trust,”
land trusts are not usually organized under trust principles.14 In its
guide to forming a land trust, the Land Trust Alliance notes that the
unifying feature tying together all land trusts is “their first-hand in-
volvement in land transactions or management.”15
Land trusts can be involved in all steps of the conservation proc-
ess. Most are involved in some, but not all of these steps. They can
acquire land through all of the mechanisms described below.16 Once it
has acquired the land, the land trust can either manage the land itself
or transfer it to another organization—either another land trust or a
government entity.17 Some land trusts provide assistance in conserva-
tion transactions without actually participating by negotiating, re-
searching, or lending their expertise.18
The most straightforward way for a land trust to protect a piece
of land is to buy the land. Once it becomes an owner of the land, the
land trust may use its fee ownership to control all activities on the
land. Purchase is one of the most common land trust conservation ac-
tivities, but donation may actually eclipse purchase in terms of fre-
quency of occurrence.19 While a land trust must find the funds to
make a purchase, the costs to accept a donation are minimal. When
the donation is made to a “qualified” organization as defined by sec-
12. See FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra note 8, at 21 (defining a land trust as a nonprofit
organization that preserves land by acquiring it through purchase or donation and dedicating it
to conservation).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 21–22.
15. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, supra note 11, at 1.
16. See FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra note 8, at 21 (describing the five basic techniques
land trusts use: purchase of land, acceptance of donations of land, purchase of conservation
easements, acceptance of donations of conservation easements, and the acquisition of land or
conservation easements to later reconvey to another organization); LAND TRUST ALLIANCE,
supra note 11, at 1 (explaining the various ways a land trust can be involved in conservation, in-
cluding purchase or acceptance of donations of land or conservation easements, managing land,
and acting as a middle man in conservation negotiations); infra notes 19–31.
17. FAIRFAX & GUENZLER, supra note 8, at 21.
18. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, supra note 11, at 1. For example, the Trust for Public Land
sees itself as a middleman in conservation transactions. See the Trust for Public Land, at
http://www.tpl.org/tier2_sa.cfm?folder_id=170 (last viewed January 13, 2002) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (describing how the Trust for Public Land uses its expertise to help com-
munities raise funds for open space and manage the legal and real estate complexities of the
transactions).
19. See Gustanski, supra note 7, at 10 (demonstrating that land purchase and land donation
make up almost half of land trust activity).
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tion 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code, the donor may deduct the
value of the contribution from her tax return—a significant financial
incentive.20
In recent years a new tool, the conservation easement, has
emerged as a less expensive alternative to outright sale or donation
that still provides the desired legal protection for conservation. A
conservation easement is a “legally binding agreement that perma-
nently restricts the development and future use of the land to ensure
protection of its conservation values.”21 It is best conceptualized as
one stick out of the bundle of rights that comprise fee ownership.22
The original owner retains most of the ownership but cedes to the
land trust the right to engage in various ecosystem-disturbing activi-
ties—such as construction or earthmoving—which, of course, the trust
covenants not to exercise.23 Essentially, the conservation easement is
a negative easement, but it does not meet the traditional requirement
that negative easements be appurtenant.24 Conservation easements do
not have to meet this requirement because they are not part of the
20. I.R.C. § 170(h) (2002). The definition of a “qualified” organization includes almost any
government entity, as well as charitable organizations that receive substantial public support,
including some organizations that meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3). Id. §
170(b)(1)(A). To keep this tax status, land trusts may not lobby, engage in political campaigns,
take action that would benefit a single private shareholder or individual, or receive the bulk of
its support from any source other than the public. Id. § 501(c)(3). A recent case made that in-
ducement less attractive in certain circumstances. The Fourth Circuit held that donations of
mineral-rich land by a mining company to a land trust created an antitrust claim for the mining
company’s primary rival against the donor and the land trust. Va. Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R.
Grace & Co., 156 F.3d 535, 537–41 (4th Cir. 1998). This case, however, is not likely to have a
significant chilling effect on the rate of donations because its facts are relatively unique. See id.
at 537–38 (stating that (1) the mineral in question, vermiculite, was very rare; (2) the land do-
nated held over forty percent of the known vermiculite in the United States; and (3) the case
involved the only two domestic vermiculite producers in the country).
21. Gustanski, supra note 7, at 9.
22. Federico Cheever, Environmental Law: Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of
Land Trusts and Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENV. U.
L. REV. 1077, 1079–80 (1996).
23. In practical terms, these restrictions would prevent subdivision and development,
commercial and industrial use, altering the land surface, mining, dumping waste, adding lines or
signs, or taking any action that would disturb the natural habitat, including the soil, water, and
vegetation. JANET DIEHL & THOMAS S. BARRETT, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT
HANDBOOK: MANAGING LAND CONSERVATION AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION EASEMENT
PROGRAMS 177 (1988).
24. Cheever, supra note 22, at 1080–81.
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common law—they are statutory creations of the state.25
State statutes place a number of restrictions on conservation
easements. Most states allow only two types of entities to hold con-
servation easements: government agencies with the authority to hold
interest in real property, and charitable organizations dedicated to
preserving “natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property.”26
States vary in the strictness with which they approach these require-
ments.27 Some states even impose further requirements, such as main-
tenance and upkeep standards, on holders of conservation ease-
ments.28 Very few states impose a public access requirement.29
Conservation easements have become increasingly popular, and
are quickly outstripping fee simple acquisition (through purchase or
donation) as the preferred method of conservation.30 They are aug-
mented by a multitude of other tools available for use as the occasion
warrants—including, for example, options, land exchanges, deed re-
strictions, leases, restricted sales, and other agreements.31 Depending
on the land trust’s mission and focus, it will use some or all of these
tools.
25. Id. at 1080. As of 2000, twenty-one states had adopted a conservation easement statute
that was directly influenced by the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (UCEA). Todd D.
Mayo, A Holistic Examination of the Law of Conservation Easements, in PROTECTING THE
LAND, supra note 7, at 28–30. An additional twenty-five states have adopted conservation
easement statutes that are not based on the UCEA. Id. Land trusts in states without conserva-
tion easement statutes may attempt a common law conservation easement, but those are much
more vulnerable to legal attack. See Jeffrey Tapick, Threats to the Continued Existence of Con-
servation Easements, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 257, 265–72 (2002) (detailing the arguments that
could be made against a common-law conservation easement).
26. Cheever, supra note 22, at 1084 (quoting UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT §
1(2)(ii), 12 U.L.A. 170, 170 (1996)).
27. See Mayo, supra note 25, at 35–40 (describing the variation among states in holder re-
quirements).
28. See id. at 31–35 (listing the states that impose affirmative duties on holders of conserva-
tion easements).
29. See, e.g., Karin Marchetti & Jerry Cosgrove, Conservation Easements in the First and
Second Federal Circuits, in PROTECTING THE LAND, supra note 7, at 79, 82 (describing the
statutory language and terminology that relate to conservation easements in the states that are
part of the specified Circuit); Melanie Pallone, Conservation Easements in the Third Circuit, in
PROTECTING THE LAND, supra note 7, at 150 (same); John F. Rohe, Conservation Easements in
the Sixth Federal Circuit, in PROTECTING THE LAND, supra note 7, at 270 (same); supra note 28
and accompanying text.
30. See Gustanski, supra note 7, at 14 (tracing the rise in acreage protection by conserva-
tion easements as opposed to fee title ownership).
31. Id. at 10 (cataloguing in a pie chart the various activities undertaken by land trusts).
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In addition to varying by their activities, land trusts also differ in
their scope and focus. Some are dedicated only to one piece of land.32
Others, such as the Nature Conservancy, pursue a much larger land
protection agenda.33 Still others focus on protecting only a certain
type of land, such as farmland,34 battlefields,35 backcountry,36 or urban
open space.37 This Note focuses on the actual management of lands by
land trusts, irrespective of either the method of acquisition or the ul-
timate goal.
B. Policy Arguments for Access
Land trusts are involved in work that would almost universally
be considered beneficial: preserving land from development while at
the same time fairly compensating private owners of the land. Why,
then, would anyone want to interfere with their operation by de-
manding public access onto the conserved land? Land trusts receive a
significant public subsidy in the form of tax benefits. Implicit in any
public subsidy is the belief that the activity of the organization is
beneficial to society. Land trusts, however, do not provide any imme-
diate benefits beyond conservation. A public access requirement
would balance the exchange between public subsidy and public bene-
fit.
32. See, e.g., Eno River Association, at http://www.enoriver.org (last visited Jan. 21, 2003)
(on file with the Duke Law Journal) (preserving land in the Eno River basin near Durham,
North Carolina); Truckee Donner Land Trust, at http://www.tdlandtrust.org (last visited Jan. 13,
2003) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (preserving land in the “Truckee and North Tahoe”
area of California).
33. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, supra note 11, at 1 (noting the various level of involvement in
conservation by trusts). To date, The Nature Conservancy has protected over ninety-eight mil-
lion acres of land worldwide, including fourteen million acres in the United States. Nature Con-
servancy, About Us, at http://nature.org/aboutus/ (last visited November 26, 2002) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
34. See, e.g., Merced County Farmlands and Open Space Land Trust, Our History and Mis-
sion, at http://www.mcfost.org/html/about%20mcfost.html (last visited on Nov. 22, 2002) (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (protecting farmland in Merced County, California).
35. See, e.g., Civil War Preservation Trust, Our Mission, at http://www.civilwar.orgs/mis-
sion. html (last visited Nov. 22, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (working to preserve
Civil War battlefields in nineteen states).
36. See, e.g., Wilderness Land Trust, Recovered Land, at http://www.wildernesslandtrust.
org/recoveredland.html (Nov. 13, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (dedicated to pre-
serving wilderness areas in multiple western states).
37. See, e.g., Saving the Endangered Coast, Peninsula Open Space Trust, at http://www.open
spacetrust.org/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (preserving land
on the San Francisco Peninsula).
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Land trusts benefit from the tax code in two ways. First, those
that qualify as section 501(c)(3) organizations are exempt from fed-
eral income tax.38 Second, land trusts receive additional favorable
treatment from the Internal Revenue Code in that they may solicit
donations of land and conservation easements pursuant to the quali-
fied conservation contribution deduction.39 These two benefits are
subsidies that the public grants to land trusts because it supports their
activity and wants to encourage it.
Although Congress has approved the trade—tax subsidy for land
conservation—it is not clear that the realities of the trade are even.
When land trusts manage conservation contribution lands, the only
real requirement the Internal Revenue Code imposes is that the land
be protected from development.40 Moreover, when Congress ap-
proved the deduction, there was no evidence that the members voting
for it had carefully balanced the merits of the trade.41 Conservation
easements sometimes impose affirmative duties on the holder of the
easement to maintain the land, but that is the exception, not the
rule.42 Even when affirmative duties are imposed, they almost never
include a right of public access to the conserved land.43
If a land trust is only required to preserve land from develop-
ment, it is providing only an existential benefit,44 which is generally
understood as the psychological value the land provides by simply
existing in its preserved state. Environmental activist Edward Abbey
succinctly described this position, “[w]e need wilderness whether or
not we ever set foot in it . . . . I may never in my life get to Alaska, for
38. I.R.C. § 501(a) (2002).
39. Id. § 170(h) (stating the general requirements for contributing individual property).
40. The conservation contribution deduction requires that the land serve a “conservation
purpose,” and describes a wide range of uses that qualify; all of these uses, however, would pre-
clude any sort of development on the land. Id. § 170(h)(4)(A). The terms of the deduction have
been favorably construed in Internal Revenue Service (IRS) private letter rulings, assuring land
trusts and donors that the requirements will not be harshly challenged. Stephen J. Small, An
Obscure Tax Code Provision Takes Private Land Protection into the Twenty-First Century, in
PROTECTING THE LAND, supra note 7, at 57–60.
41. See Small, supra note 40, at 56–57 (noting that there was little debate when the first
form of the deduction was adopted and that very few interest groups were involved in drafting
the legislation that made the deduction permanent).
42. See Mayo, supra note 25, at 31–35 (listing the states that impose affirmative duties on
holders of conservation easements).
43. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
44. See Laitos & Carr, supra note 5, at 228 (stating that “[e]xistence value defines the satis-
faction an individual derives from knowing a resource continues to exist, even if that person
never personally uses the resource and will not likely do so in the future”).
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example, but I am grateful that it’s there.”45 This espousal of the exis-
tential benefit is the classic preservationist position.
In contrast, if the land trust were to provide public access, it
would also provide an additional public benefit: the recreational
benefit. Unlike Abbey, a recreationist would value Alaska for the
“play” opportunities46 it offers, and would view the preservationist
philosophy with suspicion.47 Moreover, because the law currently fa-
vors the preservationist point of view by requiring taxpayers to subsi-
dize it, imposing a public access requirement would probably increase
the taxpayers’ perceived return on their “investment.”
Finally, in addition to their potential to cordon off their own
land, land trusts could have a negative impact on public access to
public land. If the government were, in recognition of the land trusts’
activities, to slow its own acquisition and preservation of land, a per-
petually increasing percentage of American open land would be in
private hands. Already, there are signs that government is being left
behind in the preservation business: private conservation easement
donors have recently been preferentially donating to private land
45. Id. at 194 (quoting EDWARD ABBEY, DESERT SOLITAIRE: A SEASON IN THE WILDER-
NESS 129 (1968)).
46. Recreationists are not in agreement about what qualifies as “good” recreation. For ex-
ample, nonmotorized recreationists continually criticize jet-skiers and snowmobilers for their
heavier impact on the environment. See Arthur Allen, Where the Snowmobiles Roam; What’s
Worth More, Unspoiled Wilderness or the Sacred Bond Between a Man and a Really Loud Ma-
chine?, WASH. POST MAG., Aug. 18, 2002, at W15 (describing the push toward regulating the
use of snowmobiles); Susan Sward & Jim Doyle, Setback for Tahoe Jet-Skiers; Judge Rules for
Protection of Lake, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 7, 1988 at A15 (describing the ban on jet-skis and motor-
boats at Lake Tahoe). Dale A. Oesterle satirized the hierarchy of “outdoorsy” virtue as follows:
[H]ikers (other than those in wheelchairs and those who are out of shape) and wild-
life watchers (other than those in helicopters) are more deserving than campers
(other than backpackers, see hikers), who (with the exception of those driving recrea-
tional vehicles) are more deserving than mountain bikers, who are more deserving
than downhill (but not cross-country) skiers, who are more deserving than hunters
(but not fisherpersons, see hikers), who are more deserving than off-road motorcy-
clists.
Oesterle, supra note 2, at 549. This Note does not take a position on what kind of recreational
activities are appropriate because that decision is necessarily one that must be made in response
to the condition of the particular piece of land, among other factors.
47. See SAX, supra note 3, at 2:
Attitudes toward nature and recreational preferences seem purely matters of private
taste. The auto tourist sees himself as every bit as virtuous as the backpacker. The
preservationist often appears as nothing more than the voice of effete affluence, try-
ing to save a disproportionate share of the public domain for his own minoritarian
pleasures.
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trusts rather than to the government.48 If this pattern were to con-
tinue, the wild and majestic parts of America—not to mention the
greenbelts and farmland—could be preserved, but the public would
only see them in photographs, if at all.
As private landholders, the land trusts have the right to exclude
all comers from their property unless the conservation easement on
the land specifically provides otherwise. Land trusts could also pro-
vide special access privileges to their members.49 If a land trust en-
forced its fee simple rights, only those who could pay the membership
fee could gain entrance. This would lead to a worrying situation in
which the wealthy would have access to these eco-reserves, but the
general public would not. True, the land is preserved for future gen-
erations, but the present generation gets nothing more than the psy-
chological benefit of knowing that the land is protected.
II.  PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
While there are many different ways for public access propo-
nents to change the current system to make future conservation
holdings open to the public,50 the arguments for immediate access are
more limited. Of these arguments, the public trust doctrine is one of
the most promising.
The theory of the public trust is an ancient common law doc-
trine.51 Described simply, the public trust doctrine provides that, be-
cause natural resources belong to the public as a whole, private own-
ers may not deprive the public of access. Traditionally, the public
trust protected beaches and navigable waterways so that commerce
could proceed unimpeded.52 In the last fifty years, however, both the
scope and the purpose of the public trust doctrine have changed.
48. See Gustanski, supra note 7, at 17 (describing the transition of conservation easements
from government to private hands).
49. See Nature Conservancy, Travel, at http://nature.org/aboutus/travel/ (last visited No-
vember 26, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (advertising special travel arrangements
on Nature Conservancy land).
50. See infra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
51. See Susan Morath Horner, Embryo, Not Fossil: Breathing Life into the Public Trust
Doctrine in Wildlife, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 23, 31 (2000) (describing the public trust doc-
trine as having roots in early Roman civil law).
52. DENNIS J. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: SHAPING SOCIETY
THROUGH LAND USE REGULATION 224 (1993); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of
Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA
L. REV. 631, 636 (1986).
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A. Development of the Theory
The public trust is a common law doctrine that has developed
slowly through judicial decisions, but the idea itself predates the
common law. The concept of the public trust is traditionally consid-
ered to date back to Roman law,53 although some believe it may be
even older.54 After centuries of lapse, the doctrine that certain lands
always belong to the sovereign was revived in England during the
early seventeenth century to augment the declining fortunes of the
Crown.55 When the colonists came to the Americas, they brought the
doctrine, although they changed its beneficiary from the monarchy to
the public as a whole.56 According to Martin v. Waddell,57 the thirteen
original colonies held title to their tidal waterways when they entered
the Union, never surrendering their territory to the federal govern-
ment.58 The subsequent states were deemed to have taken title to
their respective tidal lands upon entry into the Union under the
Equal Footing Doctrine.59 Thus, the idea that the government—on
behalf of the Crown or the People—has an interest in land that can
supercede an individual owner’s right is an ancient and established
part of the common law.
Throughout the nineteenth century, the public trust doctrine was
static. The shorelines and land underlying navigable rivers were held
to be in the “public trust.”60 This status limited, and continues to limit,
the actions that a private property owner could take on these lands to
53. Lazarus, supra note 52, at 633.
54. See Horner, supra note 51, at 31 (noting that some commentators believe that the pub-
lic trust doctrine may have roots in ancient Greece).
55. See id. at 35–37 (describing the role of the public trust in the power struggles of six-
teenth- and seventeenth-century England); Carol M. Rose, Takings, Public Trust, Unhappy
Truths, and Helpless Giants: A Review of Professor Joseph Sax’s Defense of the Environment
Through Academic Scholarship: Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q.
351, 351 (1998) (alluding to the role of the public trust in debates on the royal prerogative).
56. See Lazarus, supra note 52, at 636 (stating that the nineteenth–century jurists specifi-
cally included jus publicum, the rights of the general public, in their division of water rights).
57. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
58. Id. at 410; see also Horner, supra note 51, at 38 (describing the process by which the
public trust doctrine was solidified in the United States); Lazarus, supra note 52, at 637 (charac-
terizing Martin v. Waddell as holding that states own the beds of navigable water “in their sov-
ereign capacity”).
59. See Horner, supra note 51, at 38 (noting that the states were admitted to the Union af-
ter the first thirteen took title to their tidelands under the Equal Footing Doctrine).
60. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source and Scope, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 454–55 (1989).
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actions that did not interfere with the public trust.61 Private property
rights with respect to land in the public trust were subordinate to the
public trust. The nineteenth century public trust was one of negative
rights. While it prevented harmful action, it imposed no affirmative
duties on the landowner or the state to care for the land.
Just before the turn of the century, Illinois Central Railroad Co.
v. Illinois62 changed the nature of the public trust nationally by estab-
lishing the basic affirmative responsibilities of the states with respect
to the public trust.63 The Supreme Court held that a state cannot sell
land that is held in public trust, nor can it transfer away its fiduciary
responsibilities toward the land.64 After Illinois Central Railroad, the
concept lay dormant, confined to waterways, until Professor Joseph
Sax published his groundbreaking article on the public trust.65 Profes-
sor Sax argued that the principle of public trust extends far beyond
the traditional realms of waterways and parklands. He claimed that
“[p]ublic trust problems are found whenever government regulation
comes into question, and they occur in a wide range of situations in
which diffuse public interests need protection against tightly organ-
ized groups with clear and immediate goals.”66 Therefore, the gov-
ernment has an additional affirmative duty to protect the public re-
sources that are part of the public trust. Since the article was written,
judges across the country have been changing the nature of the public
trust through decisions that broaden its geographic protections, and
widen the range of activities it encompasses.67
61. See COYLE, supra note 52, at 224–25 (arguing that the public trust doctrine has been
applied beyond its original commercial intentions to include preservation and environmental
motives).
62. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
63. See Lazarus, supra note 52, at 640 (calling the Illinois Central decision a “lodestar” in
part because judges still use its reasoning to justify their decisions).
64. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 437, 452–53.
65. See Rose, supra note 55, at 352 (arguing that Professor Sax “ushered in the . . . most
recent major revival of the public trust concept” by “unhook[ing] it from its traditional moor-
ings on or around water bodies and appl[ying] it to dry land” (citing Joseph L. Sax, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471
(1970))).
66. Sax, supra note 65, at 556.
67. In the 1980s, it appeared that the public trust expansion was ending, and that contrac-
tion was in sight. See Lazarus, supra note 52, at 713–14 (arguing that recent Supreme Court
cases, including Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), presaged the beginning of the
end for the “environmental” public trust doctrine). The Supreme Court, however, seems to have
avoided a repudiation of an environmental interpretation of the public trust doctrine. See Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988) (holding that states have the right to
determine the extent of their public trusts).
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B. Geographic Breadth of the Trust
Whether the public trust argument allows for public access to
private conservation land depends on the state.68 At a minimum, land
trusts that own land on which there is a navigable waterway must al-
low public navigation on the waterway.69 If, however, the state has
adopted a broader interpretation of the public trust, as has Califor-
nia,70 the land trust would be subject to public trust restrictions
through all the tiny tributaries on the land. Because of the fractal na-
ture of watershed drainage systems, that makes for pervasive control.
Tributaries collect water from every part of the land surface, joining
together to make larger streams, and then rivers, and eventually
draining into the ocean. While navigable waterways are necessarily
substantial enough for a watercraft (and therefore identifiable), tribu-
taries are everywhere and can be quite small. California’s ruling sig-
nificantly extends the public trust inland by including everything from
the Colorado River to the tiniest mountain stream to a desert gully
that carries water from time to time.
After the Sax article was published, the California Supreme
Court extended the public trust inland from the shore in a series of
cases. From its original definition in terms of commerce, navigation,
and fishing,71 the court broadened the doctrine of the public trust in
California. First, two cases established the primacy of the public trust
in tidelands, even in cases where those lands were legally sold to pri-
vate owners under state authorization.72 After these cases were de-
68. See Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 475 (affirming that states have “the authority to
define the limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as
they see fit”).
69. See supra notes 52–59 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
71. See Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (defining these terms to include
the rights to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, and use for boating or general recreation purposes the
navigable waters of the state).
72. See City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Props., 644 P.2d 792, 794 (Cal. 1982) (de-
scribing how the owner traced title to a Mexican grant that was affirmed by federal patent proc-
esses); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 363 (Cal. 1980) (stating that the private
company had purchased the land from the state in a sale that was authorized for the benefit of
the public trust); COYLE, supra note 52, at 131–32 (discussing the importance of Berkeley and
Venice Peninsula in setting new public trust precedent).
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cided it was clear that private property owners of tidelands could not
rely on any supposed exemptions from the public trust.73
The next expansion of the public trust in California occurred in a
second pair of cases in which the California Supreme Court held that
the shores of both Clear Lake and Lake Tahoe were part of the pub-
lic trust.74 Consequently, by extension, all inland lakes were included
in the public trust.75
The most recent extension of the public trust came at the ex-
pense of government. In National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court,76 the court was faced with the problem of Los Angeles County
taking vast amounts of water from Mono Lake, thereby dangerously
depleting it.77 The court held that all tributaries are part of the public
trust on the ground that, because the public trust already protected
navigable waterways, it made sense to protect the waterways from up-
stream degradation as well.78
The extension of the public trust in California stopped there, but
the possible future is not hard to see. If tributaries are part of the
public trust because of their impact on navigable waterways, there is
no scientific barrier from declaring the entire watershed part of the
public trust. The tributaries themselves are formed by water flowing
over the land into small streams.79 Eventually the California public
trust doctrine could break free from its water-based origins to apply
to all natural resources, as Professor Sax foresaw.
Other states have not followed such a hydrologic approach to the
public trust, but they have extended its reach nonetheless. Where the
public trust traditionally only protected the wet sand of a beach, it has
73. See COYLE, supra note 52, at 132 (stating that the California court held that all lands
bordering navigable waters in the state could be “subject to the trust obligations of preserva-
tion”).
74. State v. Superior Court, 625 P.2d 239, 252 (Cal. 1981) (holding that an owner of land
along the shorelines of navigable nontidal waters—in this case, Clear Lake—had title to land
between the high and low water marks, but that the title was subject to the public trust); State v.
Superior Court, 625 P.2d 256, 260 (Cal. 1981) (holding that boundaries between public and pri-
vate lands should be determined with reference to the lake’s—in this case, Lake Tahoe’s—cur-
rent condition).
75. COYLE, supra note 52, at 132.
76. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
77. Id. at 711.
78. Id. at 720–21.
79. See M.J. SELBY, HILLSLOPE MATERIALS AND PROCESSES 214–18 (1993) (explaining
how rainfall runs across and through the ground to reach streams and rivers).
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also been extended to protect dry sand on a beach.80 The trust has also
been extended to include wildlife81 and parklands.82 Some states have
even adopted legislation or constitutional amendments declaring that
all publicly held natural resources are subject to the public trust.83 The
few codifications of the public trust notwithstanding, it remains pri-
marily a common law doctrine applicable to all land, not just land
owned by the state, and will likely continue to develop on a case-by-
case basis in each state.
C. Activities Protected by the Trust
The activities protected by the public trust also vary. At a mini-
mum, the public trust protects navigation and fishing.84 Some states
have chosen to limit their public trusts to that level. For example,
Massachusetts took a restrictive interpretation of the right to walk
along beaches.85 Faced with the question of whether the public trust
access right to walk along beaches included the right to recreate at the
beach, the justices concluded that the right of access was a right of
passage only and did not extend to recreational activities while on the
public trust land.86 Maryland has similarly rejected a chance to extend
the public access rights of the public trust.87
States are split between limited access, such as that allowed in
Maryland and Massachusetts, and a more broad right of access. Many
80. Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 573 (N.J. 1978) (holding that dry beach is
part of the New Jersey public trust, even when the beach has been substantially improved by a
private owner).
81. Wade v. Kramer, 459 N.E.2d 1025, 1027–28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (recognizing that wild-
life is part of the Illinois public trust, but reasoning that the legislature has the authority to de-
termine when public need for transportation overrides the public interest in wildlife, and refus-
ing to stop the construction of a bridge that would cause some environmental damage).
82. Parsons v. Walker, 328 N.E.2d 920, 926 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (implying that the Illinois
public trust includes public parks).
83. See Horner, supra note 51, at 58–72 (describing the varying success that Louisiana,
Pennsylvania, Hawaii, Alaska, and Florida have had with codifications of the public trust).
84. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 456–59 (1892) (discussing the history of
the public trust doctrine, including the traditional protection of navigation and fishing, to sup-
port the conclusion that the beds underlying navigable waters are part of the public trust in
every state).
85. See Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 313 N.E.2d 561, 566
(Mass. 1974) (holding that the Massachusetts public trust doctrine does not include the right to
walk on the beach for bathing).
86. Id.
87. Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Mayor & Council of Ocean City, 332 A.2d 630, 638 (Md. 1975)
(rejecting an extension of Maryland’s public trust doctrine to include recreational interests).
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states, including those that have recently examined the issue, have
significantly broadened the trust to include a wide range of activities.88
Most importantly for purposes of this Note, several states have found
that the public trust includes a right to recreation.89 For example, the
public trust in Wisconsin includes the rights to sailing, swimming,
hunting, and enjoying scenic beauty.90 In a more recent case, Wash-
ington courts affirmed expansive access rights in the Washington
public trust, but acknowledged that the court must balance the bene-
fits of allowing access and protecting the environment.91 In that case,
the court held that the public trust rights of access do not include the
right to use jet-skis that are harmful to water and wildlife.92
Instead of cataloging the activities that are protected by the pub-
lic trust, New Jersey has conceptualized the trust differently. The Su-
preme Court of New Jersey declared that the public trust is a flexible
concept that changes with the changing needs of the population.93 In
Borough of Neptune City v. Avon-By-The-Sea, the court concluded
that the public trust doctrine forbids municipalities from discriminat-
ing between residents and nonresidents when charging user fees for
the beach—access must be provided equally to all.94 Using this kind of
reasoning, a court would be free to go beyond the classic fishing and
navigation activities to find a broader recreational interest in the
public trust.
88. See, e.g., Larman v. State, 552 N.W.2d 158, 161 (Iowa 1996) (stating that the public trust
doctrine encompasses recreational uses); State v. Longshore, 5 P.3d 1256, 1262–63 (Wash. 2000)
(declaring that the public trust in Washington includes “incidental rights” such as boating and
swimming as well as the right to navigation).
89. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 465 P.2d 50, 58–60 (Cal. 1970) (holding that the California
public trust recreational interest is superior to the private property interest); Gerwitz v. City of
Long Beach, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495, 511–12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972) (holding that the New York public
trust recreational interest is superior to a municipal interest); Weden v. San Juan County, 958
P.2d 273, 283–85 (Wash. 1998) (acknowledging that the Washington public trust includes an in-
terest in fishing, boating, waterskiing, and other recreational purposes, but declining to extend a
protected right to operate personal watercrafts that were hazardous to the water and wildlife);
Hixon v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 146 N.W.2d 577, 582 (Wis. 1966) (referring to Wisconsin’s public
trust as encompassing sailing, swimming, hunting, and enjoyment of scenic beauty).
90. Hixon, 146 N.W.2d at 582.
91. Weden, 958 P.2d at 283–85.
92. Id.
93. See Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54–55
(N.J. 1972) (noting that “[t]he public trust doctrine, like all common law principles, should not
be considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to meet changing conditions
and needs of the public it was created to benefit”).
94. Id. at 55.
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Finally, Alaska has paid unusual attention to the access element
of the public trust.95 The state has consistently protected an equal
right of access to wildlife.96 This attention to access is probably a re-
sponse to Alaska’s population: an unusually large percentage of in-
digenous people whose livelihood is directly tied to the land.97 Despite
a different motivation for access to public land than that enunciated
in other states (i.e., livelihood rather than recreation), Alaska uses the
same device, the public trust, to provide access. Thus, the hunting and
fishing rights the Alaskan courts have derived from the trust are held
by all residents of the state equally. This equal access stance may
change if the wildlife populations suffer, but it remains an excellent,
and perhaps the strongest, example of a state strongly protecting its
citizens’ right of access to the public trust.
D. Application of Public Trust Doctrine to Land Trusts
A land trust is no different than any other property owner when
it comes to the public trust. To determine how the public trust would
impact a land trust’s holdings, the land trust must engage in a two-
step analysis. First, it must determine which land that it owns, if any,
is subject to the public trust. Second, it must discover what activities
are protected by the public trust.
As discussed above, the geographic breadth of the public trust is
determined by the state.98 At a minimum, if a land trust owns any
navigable waterways, those would be subject to the public trust.99 In
broader public trust states, much more land trust land could be sub-
ject to the public trust. When the land trust holds public trust land, it
has the same responsibilities that any private owner of trust land
would have. It must not take any action that would interfere with the
public trust. Because the public trust has taken on a preservationist
tone since the Sax article,100 and because land trusts are generally de-
voted to the preservation of land, that would not generally pose a
problem: the goals of the public trust and the land trust are the same.
The public trust bars significant alteration of the land, and the land
95. See Horner, supra note 51, at 66–68 (discussing the origins of the access element in
Alaska’s public trust).
96. Id. at 67–68.
97. Id. at 66.
98. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 65–67 and accompanying text.
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trust would have covenanted not to do so when it acquired the land.
Thus far, there is no conflict between the land trust and the public
trust.
In fact, their goals are so similar that land trusts may even be
able to purchase state-owned public trust land—a privilege that a
normal private citizen would not be able to enjoy. Although Illinois
Central Railroad held that states may not sell public trust land, the
decision did include an exception. When the sale is the interest of the
public trust, the state may sell land that is held in the public trust.101 A
state might want to make the sale because of limited financial re-
sources. Land ownership is costly, and the state may want to minimize
its costs by selling its public trust land to an organization dedicated to
the preservation of land. Under most analyses, this kind of transac-
tion would be unobjectionable, but it could pose a problem for the
general public. If the land trust closes off the previously open public
land, the sale has deprived the public of access to open space. This is
precisely where the activities protected by the public trust become
important.
As with geography, the state has the right to determine what ac-
tivities are protected by the public trust.102 If the land trust is in a state
with a broad, recreational public trust, the land trust would be re-
quired to allow access onto public trust lands for recreation. Then the
sale would be truly unobjectionable: the land would be protected and
the public enjoyment would be unimpaired. Moreover, because pri-
vate property rights on public trust lands are subordinate to the pub-
lic trust, the requirement that the organization make its public trust
lands available for public trust activities cannot be considered a tak-
ing.103 If the public trust includes a recreational interest, it is an inter-
est that the public possesses now, and can use now, without any fur-
ther legal or legislative action. Therefore the scope of activities
protected by each state’s public trust is of critical importance. In a ju-
risdiction like Massachusetts, the public trust argument would have
limited impact on land trusts because the trust only protects basic
fishing and navigation rights.104 In a state like Washington, however,
101. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455–56 (1892).
102. See supra Part II.C.
103. See infra Part III.A.
104. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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the public trust would require land trusts to make their public trust
land available for extensive recreational activities.105
III.  THE PUBLIC TRUST RESPONSE TO
ACCESS-BARRING ARGUMENTS
An access requirement to private land is controversial, and will
almost certainly meet with some resistance. This Part will address two
of the strongest arguments that opponents of public access are likely
to offer in response to the argument made in this Note: takings and
environmental necessity. Although both arguments are strong, nei-
ther should be seen as an absolute bar on public access to public trust
land.
A. Takings
Any discussion of government-mandated public access to private
land immediately invokes the specter of Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission.106 The case that dramatically ushered in a new era of
takings jurisprudence,107 Nollan stands for the proposition that un-
compensated public access over private land is a per se taking.108 In
the case, the Nollans owned a small beachfront house that they
wanted to demolish and rebuild.109 The rebuilt house would have been
larger and taller than the original.110 Because their house was in the
Coastal Zone, they were subject to the authority of the California
Coastal Commission, which approved the permit on the condition
that the Nollans allow a beach access corridor across their land.111
Upon challenge, the Supreme Court held that there was not a suffi-
cient nexus between the access requirement and the impact caused by
the increased height to justify it as a proper exercise of the state’s po-
lice power.112 Therefore, the access requirement was a per se taking.113
105. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
106. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
107. The revolution was not welcomed by all. Justice Brennan sharply dissented, claiming
that the majority’s nexus test “imposes a standard . . . that has been discredited for the better
part of [the] century.” Id. at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 831–32.
109. Id. at 828.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 837, 841–42.
113. Id.
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Although development exactions are not implicated by this Note
(because the land trusts are not developing the land they hold), any
sort of postpurchase access requirement that government could fash-
ion would certainly be a per se taking. Just as in Nollan, the owners
would be required to allow strangers to pass across their land at any
time. This is the sort of easement that the Supreme Court in Nollan
said the government “must pay for”114 if it determined that it was in
the community’s interest to have access to such lands.115
But Nollan does not absolutely bar public access to private land.
The public trust doctrine requires at least limited public access to any
land that is part of the public trust, whether it is held privately or
publicly, and that access is not subject to a takings argument. When
land is within the geographic scope of the public trust, private owners
hold the land subject to the public trust; their rights are subordinate to
those of the trust.116 Therefore, there is no taking because the private
owner never actually owned the public trust stick of the bundle of
ownership rights on the property.117 The owner cannot do anything
that would interfere with the public trust. When the public trust in-
cludes the right to access and recreation, the owner may not do any-
thing that will interfere with access and recreation. It is not a taking; it
is a limitation the owner accepted when she purchased the land. Just
as it is not a taking when the holder of an easement exercises her
rights, it is not a taking when the beneficiary of the public trust, the
public, exercises its rights with respect to public trust land.
The public trust argument is, of course, limited to public trust
land. Land that is not part of the public trust will not be protected
from a takings argument, but that does not mean that states are lim-
ited to protecting access only according to their public trust. State
legislatures could protect access to future conservation land by mak-
114. Id. at 842.
115. This, of course, assumes that the government is unwilling to acquire an access easement
through its powers of eminent domain. If, on the other hand, the government were willing to
exercise its power of eminent domain to secure the right of access for the public, the takings ar-
gument is moot.
116. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
117. Lazarus, supra note 52, at 648. This theory of takings could be interpreted to freeze the
public trust at its current state in a particular jurisdiction because a judicial change might alter
the property rights acquired by individual property owners. The Supreme Court, however, has
repeatedly emphasized that judicial decisions of this kind do not constitute takings. Joseph L.
Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473, 477–78 n.11 (1989) (dis-
cussing the Supreme Court decisions holding that court decisions changing state property law
cannot themselves be considered takings).
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ing a statutory change to their conservation easement statutes that
would mandate public access to land held in a conservation easement.
Because conservation easements are statutory creations,118 their prop-
erties can be changed. State legislatures can amend their conservation
easement statutes to include a requirement that the holder of the
easement make the land available for public use. In fact, some states
already include this requirement.119 If a state legislature were per-
suaded to make this change, it would probably have to be prospec-
tive, to avoid a takings problem. But once the requirement was in
place, any entity taking a conservation easement would be obliged to
allow public access to the land covered by the easement.
B. Environmental Protection
The concept of “public access” is ill defined. One can easily un-
derstand the concern a land trust might feel about a stampede over its
fragile ecosystem. Of course, this would not be the case. Sensible and
reasonable environmental restrictions make sense to preserve the ul-
timate goal of conservation, and they are required by the balance be-
tween preservation of natural resources and preservation of access
inherent in the public trust.120 But what if the land trust argued that
the land must be completely protected from human contact to be
properly conserved?
This could very well be true; some ecosystems could be so fragile
that even having the occasional hiker pass through would be devas-
tating. In these cases, however, other environmental laws would
trump. Just as the public trust doctrine trumps the private property
owner’s rights,121 the Endangered Species Act would trump the public
trust.122 For example, the public trust universally allows navigation
and fishing. However, a public trust argument would not relieve one
118. See supra notes 21–29 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Weden v. San Juan County, 958 P.2d 273, 284 (Wash. 1998) (holding that the
needs of resource protection prevented jet-skis from claiming public trust access protection).
For a full discussion of the case, see supra note 91 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
122. The issue of conflict between protected public trust activities has never been litigated,
but given the broad authority granted to the Environmental Protection Agency through the En-
dangered Species Act, this seems a very reasonable assumption. See Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314–17, 324 (2001) (holding that, although the
California State Water Resources Control Board had the right, pursuant to the Endangered
Species Act, to deprive the plaintiff water permit holders of water in order to preserve two spe-
cies of fish, the permit holders were entitled to compensation for their loss).
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of liability for “taking” an endangered fish while exercising the right
to fish. Environmental reasons may preclude public access in some
areas and limit it in many others, but the fundamental need for public
access cannot be avoided based on environmental arguments. Just as
the federal government varies access to some federal lands for envi-
ronmental reasons, land trusts could be expected to make case-by-
case stewardship decisions to maintain both public access and the en-
vironmental integrity of the land.
CONCLUSION
Land trusts provide a valuable social service by stepping in where
the government does not to preserve land through private means.
However, the value of that service is severely limited when the land
trust then closes off its prize from the public. As a matter of public
policy, the trusts should provide public access in return for the valu-
able tax breaks they enjoy. This could be enforced prospectively
without creating a taking by amending the state’s conservation ease-
ment statute to require the holder of a conservation easement to al-
low public access on the land. As a practical matter, the public trust
doctrine currently mandates access to certain kinds of land, no matter
whom the owner. It dictates that land subject to the public trust must
be made available for all purposes the public trust encompasses.
When the state has defined its public trust to include a recreational
interest, the land trust would have little choice but to make its public
trust land available.
Moreover, it is in the trust’s interest to open its land. By provid-
ing public access and finding a third way between preservationists and
recreationists, land trusts will bring a powerful ally to their side: the
outdoor enthusiasts whose love of the land is built on years of long
association with it.
